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M y assignment at the symposium at which this Article waspresented was to relate private standard setting to the
symposium theme: the "public and the private," and the possibility
that whatever "boundaries" they may have are in "transition." I am
very glad to have done it. The antitrust relevance of standard-setting
organizations (SSOs) is obvious enough. In the ordinary case, at least
a few of an SSO's participants will have some pecuniary stake in the
organization's work, and they might be able to use its influence for
anticompetitive ends. SSOs have made appearances off and on in
antitrust matters for many years, and the antitrust community has
*Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland State University. I welcome all feedback at
csagers@law.csuohio.edu. My thanks to moderator Phil Weiser, panelists Jonathan
Koppell and Michael Likosky, and other commenters at the American Antitrust Institute's
2010 annual conference. Thanks also to Bert Foer for inviting me and for discussion prior
to the conference.
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always had them in more or less conscious awareness as matters of
concern. But I believe that in some respects a larger aspect of their
significance has been overlooked.' I believe they uniquely implicate
certain deep and not very visible theoretical issues in our competition
policy. Those deeper issues have led us to develop a complicated,
shared system of responsibility for resource allocation.
Among lawyers, standard setting occasioned a brief flurry of
academic interest about ten to fifteen years ago,2 apparently because it
sat nicely at the juncture of three trends of then growing interest: the
procompetitive potential of some horizontal collaborations, the
relationship between antitrust and the evolving high-tech sector, and
the emerging economics of "network" effects. A bit more recently,
SSOs have been a fairly hot topic again, owing to a spate of high-
profile Federal Trade Commission (FTC) challenges to alleged
II have also written about these matters in a few prior articles. See Christopher L.
Sagers, Antitrust Immunity and Standard Setting Organizations: A Case Study in the
Public-Private Distinction, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393 (2004) [hereinafter Case Study];
Chris Sagers, Commentary, Raising the Price of Pork in Texas: A Few Thoughts on
Ghosh, Bush, and the Future of the Antitrust Immunities, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 395 (2008)
[hereinafter Pork in Texas]. I address the larger issues in Christopher L. Sagers, The Legal
Structure of American Freedom and the Provenance of the Antitrust Immunities, 2002
UTAH L. REV. 927 (2002), Chris Sagers, Monism, Nominalism, and Public-Private in the
Work ofMargaret Jane Radin, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 219 (2006) [hereinafter Monism], and
Chris Sagers, The Myth of "Privatization," 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 37 (2007) [hereinafter
Myth].
2 See, e.g., James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Standard-Setting Consortia, Antitrust, and
High-Technology Industries, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 247 (1995); David A. Balto, Standard
Setting in the 21st Century Network Economy, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., June 2001,
at 5; Jack E. Brown, Technology Joint Ventures to Set Standards or Define Interfaces, 61
ANTITRUST L.J. 921 (1993); Sean P. Gates, Standards, Innovation, and Antitrust:
Integrating Innovation Concerns into the Analysis of Collaborative Standard Setting, 47
EMORY L.J. 583 (1998); Harry S. Gerla, Federal Antitrust Law and Trade and
Professional Association Standards and Certification, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 471 (1994);
Daniel J. Gifford, Developing Models for a Coherent Treatment of Standard-Setting Issues
Under the Patent, Copyright, andAntitrust Laws, 43 IDEA 331 (2003); Douglas D. Leeds,
Essay, Raising the Standard: Antitrust Scrutiny of Standard-Setting Consortia in High
Technology Industries, 7 FORDHAM INT. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 641 (1997); Mark A.
Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1041
(1996); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889 (2002) [hereinafter Intellectual Property Rights];
Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, Standard Seiting, and Self-Regulation, 28 N. KY. L.
REV. 822 (2001). Standard setting was also the focus of several symposia. See, e.g.,
Symposium, The Interface Between Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust Law, 87
MINN. L. REv. 1695 (2003); Symposium, Private Accreditation in the Regulatory State, L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1994, at 1.
3 This is nicely explained in Gates, supra note 2, at 585-97.
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"patent hold-ups."4 Of course SSOs were also involved in a
smattering of very well-known matters going back several decades,5
4 While the specifics of the patent hold-up cases turn out not to be especially relevant to
the concerns of this Article, several of them--especially the FTC's recent and much-
discussed Rambus, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S.Ct. 1318 (2009), and Negotiated Data Solutions LLC (N-Data), No. C-4234
(F.T.C. Sept. 22, 2008)-are big and important cases in their own right and deserve at
least some discussion here.
A patent hold-up occurs when an SSO participant fails to disclose that it owns patents
that would be infringed by the adoption of a standard under consideration before the SSO.
If patent rights are incorporated into a standard, and the standard then becomes significant
in the industry, that participant may acquire a significant degree of market power it
otherwise would not have. The first of the FTC's patent hold-up cases resulted in a fairly
broad consent order constraining the computer manufacturer, Dell, Inc., from enforcing
patents that it managed to include in an influential standard, allegedly by lying about them.
Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996). Another very interestiig matter was the
long-running Union Oil Co. of Cal. (Unocal), 140 F.T.C. 123 (2005), which raised the
arguably distinct circumstance of a patentee misleading a quasi-public regulatory body to
include patented technology in a state-mandated standard. Importantly, had the Unocal
litigation proceeded any further, it surely would have raised legal issues central to points
made in this Article, but those issues were mooted when Unocal was acquired by Chevron,
and a consent order followed.
A case that is now probably much more significant, based on facts like those in Dell, is
the FTC's ultimately unsuccessful monopolization action against the computer memory
maker, Rambus. The case is much bigger because of the FTC's loss before the D.C.
Circuit and the reasoning on which that court rejected liability. See Rambus, 522 F.3d
456. The FTC has also received a lot of attention for its decision in N-Data, in which the
majority upheld liability solely on the basis of the FTC's unfair competition authority,
with no separate finding of a Sherman Act violation. N-Data, No. C-4234 (F.T.C. Sept.
22, 2008). Among other things, the final consent order was approved over then
Commissioner Kovacic's dissent, and when the complaint was first issued, then Chairman
Majoras and Commissioner Kovacic both issued lengthy, analytical dissents challenging
the free-standing Section 5 liability theory.
The FTC first began initiating these matters at a time when the agency took high-tech
standard setting as a special policy focus. See, e.g., David A. Balto, Assistant Dir. Office
of Policy & Evaluation, Fed. Trade Comn'n, Standard Setting in a Network Economy,
Speech Before Cutting Edge Antitrust Law Seminar (Feb. 17, 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/standardsetting.htm; Christine A. Varney, Comm'r,
Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Implications in Standard Setting, Remarks at the District of
Columbia Bar Annual Seminar on Antitrust and Trade Associations (Feb. 22, 1995),
available at 1995 WL 232950. However, the special interest the Commission took at that
time may also have reflected a longer-standing interest in standard setting generally. See
BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FED. TRADE COMM'N, STANDARDS AND
CERTIFICATION: FINAL STAFF REPORT (1983) (reporting staffs findings, made during a
long investigation in support of a contemplated rule making, after an uncommonly surgical
statutory change to the Commission's organic statute removed its rule-making power as to
standards).
5 Two well-known cases are Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486
U.S. 492 (1988), and Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556
(1982). In both, the Court upheld antitrust liability where manufacturers that were SSO
members used SSO procedures to injure competitors. Going back a bit further, in Radiant
2011]1 787
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but to most antitrust observers, the topic now feels familiar and
probably a little pass6. It seems mainly like an intellectual property
issue of especial interest to counselors of high-tech clients.
I believe that impression is incorrect. When the standard-setting
phenomenon is considered in a bigger picture, it tends to cast doubt
on one particular idea, which I believe is central to our politics but is
not thought about much. The idea is that the basic choice in public
policy is between regulation by public bureaucracies on the one hand
and by markets on the other. In prior work, I have suggested
6
theoretical reasons to doubt that that is the case. This symposium is
a nice opportunity to marshal some qualitative empirical evidence
against it as well.
This Article is basically a sociological exercise. It will make two
basic arguments about how the role of standard setting in our
economy is at odds with the commonly assumed dichotomy between
bureaucracy and markets. First, I stress the great ubiquity and
influence of standard-setting activity in the United States. A large
proportion of the standards we adopt have more or less binding force,
and they exert influence far beyond high technology and
manufacturing. They are everywhere. Moreover, most matters
governed by standards are not subject to any government oversight.
They are formulated outside the government purview, and they get
their influence not from the formal force of law but from independent
forces. And yet, as I argue, those standards cannot easily be
explained as merely the results of market-driven influences. That is
to say, even though most standards are formulated outside any
government purview-and, therefore, under the bureaucracy-markets
dichotomy, should be explainable in some way as the product of
competitive markets-they are in fact not subject to price-competitive
pressures. In the discussion below, I relate this phenomenon to
theoretical developments in the social sciences concerning
"isomorphism" or "institutionalism" in markets.7 Second, the nature
of standards activities also tends to suggest that much of the social
decision making that occurs outside of markets is not actually
Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961), the Court permitted an
antitrust action to proceed against an SSO itself where there were allegations that its
repeated refusals to approve a new technology were fueled by anticompetitive motivations.
Several important but less well-known cases are discussed infra notes 40-48 and
accompanying text.
6 See Myth, supra note 1.
7 See infra Part II.
788 [Vol. 89, 785
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overseen by government-contrary to the impression given by the
bureaucracy-markets dichotomy. This second issue is the flip side of
the first. The ubiquity of SSOs not only casts some doubt on the
prominence of markets as resource allocators but also casts some
doubt on government as markets' chief alternative.
This evidence also sheds some light on the question specifically
posed as the theme of this symposium. I believe that the
"boundaries" between "public" and "private," such as they are, are
not actually changing that much. At least so far as private regulatory
conduct goes, things have been more or less the same for a long time.
Instead, I believe the problem is simply the imagery by which we




It is central to this Article to capture the standards sector in a
bigger picture. I believe that, when seen in the bigger picture, it is
clearer how private regulatory conduct usurps some of the control we
ordinarily assume is held by either markets or state entities.
Fortunately, though, extensive digression will not be needed here.
The history and work of the SSOs is exhaustively recounted in dozens
8
of significant federal policy reports; an extensive historical literature,
which now includes a number of book-length histories;9 and a rich
8 See 1 STAFF, FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY:
COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, 1 FTC REP.
234-63 (1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/report/gc vl.pdf; BUREAU OF
COMPETITION, supra note 4; OFFICE. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., GLOBAL
STANDARDS: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE FUTURE (1992), available at http://www
.strategicstandards.com/files/GlobalStandards.pdf; MAUREEN A. BREITENBERG, NAT'L
BUREAU OF STANDARDS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE ABC's OF STANDARDS-
RELATED ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1987). Also, the federal agency most
engaged in the standards sector, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, is
now required by statute to deliver an annual report to Congress concerning the standards
sector and the government's role in it. See National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act, Pub. L. No. 104-113, 110 Stat. 775 (1996) (implemented by Office of
Management and Budget, Circular No. A-l19, at § 9(c) (1998), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_al 19/#13).
9 See, e.g., SAMUEL KRISLOV, How NATIONS CHOOSE PRODUCT STANDARDS AND
STANDARDS CHANGE NATIONS (1997); DOUGLAS J. PUFFERT, TRACKS ACROSS
CONTINENTS, PATHS THROUGH HISTORY: THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF
STANDARDIZATION IN RAILWAY GAUGE (2009); ANDREW LAWRENCE RUSSELL,
"INDUSTRIAL LEGISLATURES": CONSENSUS STANDARDIZATION IN THE SECOND AND
THIRD INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTIONS (Aug. 2007) (Ph.D dissertation, Johns Hopkins Univ.),
7892011]1
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body of theory detailing what are thought to be the economic costs
and benefits.' 0
In the remainder of this Part, I highlight only three especially
useful points: what standards are, as a matter of definition; the nature
of the world in which standards are made, including the important
matter of the relationships that most influential SSOs enjoy with
federal, state, and local governments; and a summary of the legal
treatment of SSO conduct in antitrust law.
A. What Are Standards?
Discussion of standards activities is sometimes a bit clouded by
confusion of two distinct questions: (1) what a standard is and (2)
how a standard is made. In much of the policy debate, especially
among lawyers, the first question is answered not directly, but by
reference to the second question-by a description of the institutions
or processes that produce standards. Definitions often describe a
standard as the product of one of the traditional, formal SSOs-like
available at https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/32576/alr-diss
-08012007-CBO-opt.pdf; HARM SCHEPEL, THE CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE
GOVERNANCE: PRODUCT STANDARDS IN THE REGULATION OF INTEGRATING MARKETS
(2005); Nils Brunsson & Bengt Jacobsson, The Contemporary Expansion of
Standardization, in A WORLD OF STANDARDS 1 (Nils Brunsson & Bengt Jacobsson eds.,
2000); Paul A. David & Mark Shurmer, Formal Standards-Setting for Global
Telecommunications and Information Services, 20 TELECOMM. POL'Y 789, 790-93
(1996); Robert W. Hamilton, The Role ofNongovernmental Standards in the Development
of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (1978);
Marc A. Olshan, Standards-Making Organizations and the Rationalization of American
Life, 34 Soc. Q. 319 (1993); Marian P. Opala, The Anatomy of Private Standards-Making
Process: The Operating Procedures of the USA Standards Institute, 22 OKLA. L. REV. 45
(1969).
10 See, e.g., Paul A. David, Some New Standards for the Economics of Standardization
in the Information Age, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE 206
(Partha Dasgupta & Paul Stoneman eds., 1987); Paul A. David & Shane Greenstein, The
Economics of Compatibility Standards: An Introduction to the Recent Scholarship, 1
ECON. OF INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 3 (1990); Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz,
Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in System Markets, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 413
(2000); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Coordination Through Committees and Markets,
19 RAND J. ECON. 235 (1988); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization,
Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985); Thomas M. Jorde & David
J. Teece, Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and Antitrust, J.
ECON. PERSP., Summer 1990, at 75; Charles P. Kiidleberger, Standards as Public,
Collective and Private Goods, 36 KYKLOS 377 (1983); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro,
Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822
(1986); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985); Martin B. H. Weiss, The Standards
Development Process: A View from Political Theory, STANDARDVIEW, Dec. 1993, at 35.
790 [Vol. 89, 785
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the familiar American National Standards Institute (ANSI) or
American Society of Testing and Materials-or of one of the more ad
hoc industry consortia that have become common in high-tech sectors
in the past few decades-like VESA, the group at issue in the FTC's
recent Dell action." But defining "standard" only as the product of
the familiar, formal standard-setters that produce some of them is
significantly underinclusive.
Finding a better answer for the first question is very difficult
because "standard" turns out to be hard to define in any way except
with so much generality that it loses its meaning.12 Thinkers tend to
wax fairly philosophical about this idea's great generality; one
commentator, paraphrasing Walt Whitman no less, defined it as "vast
similitude of symbols, numbers, alphabets, currency, weights,
measurement systems, navigational elements and communications
systems."' 3  Some other, more homely definitions are no less
expansive, so much that one wonders what there could be that would
not be a standard. For example, "A standard is a formulation [for]
specifying certain features of a unit or basis of measurement, a
physical object, an action, a process, a method, a practice, a capacity,
a function, . . . a duty, a right, a responsibility, a behavior, an attitude,
a concept, or a conception."' 4  It is also clear that, by any realistic
definition, "standards" are very old and are fundamental to much of
" Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996). The Dell matter is discussed supra
note 4.
12 Many definitions have been offered. See, e.g., C. BONGERS, STANDARDIZATION:
MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN ASSORTMENT DETERMINATION 2 (1980) (adopting a
product-specific notion of "standard" but noting that "the word product must be
interpreted in its broadest sense" and that "a product is any good or service ... includ[ing]
services like education and jurisdiction"); DAVID HIEMENWAY, INDUSTRYWIDE
VOLUNTARY PRODUCT STANDARDS 4 (1975) (A standard is "something taken for a basis
of comparison, or that which is accepted for current use through authority, custom or
general consent."); I INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, STANDARDIZATION
VOCABULARY: BASIC TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 5 (1971) ("Standardization is the process
of formulating and applying rules for an orderly approach to a specific activity for the
benefit and with the cooperation of all concerned, and in particular for the promotion of
optimum overall economy, taking due account of functional conditions and safety
requirements."); cf Gerla, supra note 2, at 472 (noting that "[n]o exact definition exists for
the term 'standard').
13 Ken Krechmer, Standards Mark the Course of Economic Progress (2000)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.csrstds.com/fundeco.html.
14 JOHN GAILLARD, INDUSTRIAL STANDARDIZATION: ITS PRINCIPLES AND
APPLICATION 33 (1934).
2011]1 791
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the working of societies.15 Money, for example, and its inextricably
entwined partner concepts of weight and measurement, are primordial
standardizations that arose very early in most economies and
developed in very similar ways in cultures that had little interaction
with one another. A need for standardization is fundamental
enough that the U.S. Constitution explicitly empowers Congress to
regulate weights and measures, and standardization was the subject
of concerted action in the United States very early in the country's
history. Routinization or regularization seems to ease interaction
among individuals, groups, and peoples, and acts as an interface
between individuals and the physical world they inhabit. It is perhaps
a solution to problems posed by human epistemic incapacity, bounded
rationality, and constraints on resources.! To borrow a phrase, it
seems that this human penchant for regularization is an effort to use
the world's own redundancies to utilize the world more simply, 9 and
it seems to run very deeply in our nature.
In any case, the definitional problem nicely illustrates the two
public-private aspects of standardization that I discuss below. First,
15 Evidence of conscious standardization exists from as. early as 7000 BCE, when
uniform cubic or cylindrical stones were used in Egypt as measures of weight. Both
standard weights and other measurement exemplars were later used in Babylon and India.
Hundreds of other examples can be found from various bygone times. In 1120, Henry I of
England mandated a uniform measure of length based on the length of his own arm;
medieval European market rules widely regulated products, weights, and measures; and
the leaders of Massachusetts Bay Colony standardized a number of products long before
the Revolution, including beer, bread, nails, and bricks. The most significant gestures to
give rise to what might be thought the "modem" era of standardization occurred primarily
in the late eighteenth century. They included the adoption of the metric system by the
newly empowered French Academy of Sciences and the design of interchangeable musket
components by Eli Whitney in 1780.. Whitney's innovation is commonly said to have
introduced mass production to the United States. See generally Edward Eugene Gallahue,
Some Factors in the Development of Market Standards 20-31 (1942) (Ph.D. dissertation,
published at 9 CATH. U. AM. STUD. ECON. (1943)); KRISLOV, supra note 9, at 26-28
(discussing historical trends of standardization); LAL C. VERMAN, STANDARDIZATION: A
NEw DISCIPLINE 2-8 (1973); BREITENBERG, supra note 8, at 3-4; Olshan, supra note 9, at
320-21 (summarizing the history of standards-making organizations).
16 See Kindleberger, supra note 10, at 3 83-84 (exploring the standardization of money
as a medium of exchange); see also JAMES WILLARD HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF
MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1774-1970 (1973); KRISLOV, supra note 9, at 9-11.
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5 (empowering Congress "[t]o coin Money, regulate the
Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures").
18 Other reasons can drive routinization. It sometimes serves as a tool for serving
personal ends, for example, as when a sovereign mints currency as a route to prestige,
power, and wealth. See KRISLOV, supra note 9, at 9.
19 See generally Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 106 PROC. AM.
PHIL. SOC'Y 467 (1962).
792 [Vol. 89, 785
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standard setting is ubiquitous. Activity not clearly distinguishable
from traditional "standard setting" occurs not just in technology or
manufacturing sectors, but everywhere.20 Standard setting often
appears in code-like form, which resembles the work of legislatures. 2 1
But it can also appear as a statement of authoritative opinion;22 as a
"rule," like a professional ethical rule or union "work rule"; 2 3 and as
private adjudication.24
Second, when conceived so broadly, "standard setting" plainly
includes some conduct that seems less like private collaboration and
more like some sort of participation in policy or government. On the
one hand, it turns out to be pretty difficult to define "standard" in a
way that robustly distinguishes it from "law." One might think the
difference is that standards are made by "private" entities, but that
distinction just restates the question and makes it no less difficult-it
just begs the basically hopeless question of whether there is some line
between "public" and "private." 2 5 On the other hand, standard-setting
20 I have offered the following in a previous article and think it is appropriate here as
well:
"Standard," for present purposes, means a normative rule or opinion issued by a
group qua group and intended to change or regulate some area of human
endeavor. This is plainly not the only possible definition, and theoretical
consideration of the idea seems potentially very interesting and important. But
for present purposes it is really only important to cast the definitional net widely,
because the range of conduct that raises the concerns discussed here is very
broad.
Case Study, supra note 1, at 1402-03 (footnote omitted).
21 See, e.g., Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982)
(considering one such legislation-like code).
22 Cf Schachar v. Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397, 399-400 (7th Cir.
1989); see also infra note 63 (discussing the unique problems presented by Schachar).
23 See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (considering
ethical rules of a voluntary professional association that limited some forms of
advertising); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (holding
illegal a "work rule" issued by a self-styled "union" of dentists that no member shall
release certain patient information to dental insurers); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S.
773 (1975) (holding illegal a minimum fee schedule imposed by local bar associations).
24 ABA accreditation, for example, superficially resembles an adjudicatory function. but
is in fact an application of the ABA's own standards for law school quality and, therefore,
seems substantively indistinguishable from other standard-setting conduct. Similarly,
SSOs that issue product safety and quality standards frequently maintain product
certification programs to verify that particular products comply with the relevant standard.
For example, ANSI oversees a number of accreditation and certification bodies that issue
opinions as to whether a particular product or process complies with the appropriate ANSI
standard.
25 Monism, supra note 1, at 240-47; Myth, supra note 1, at 57-63.
7932011]
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conduct can be made to look a lot like mere lobbying or petitioning of
government, as SSOs frequently adopt their standards explicitly in the
hope that they will be incorporated by governments into official law.
As will be seen, the courts have struggled with problems like these
quite a bit.2 6
One other topic is relevant. A question closely related to what
standards are is from where they derive their power. Some standards
are literally law; thousands of them have been incorporated into
federal, state, and local law. But those that are not can still be
extremely influential. Commonly, standards are incorporated by
reference in private procurement and other contracting. They can also
be of huge influence merely as a matter of product differentiation.
Affixing the seal of a given SSO may come to connote quality or
safety, and when that ability to indicate quality comes about, the SSO
tends to accrue influence over manufacturers of an essentially
regulatory kind. Finally, in the presence of network effects, the
adoption of a standard by some number of users will have the effect
of "tipping" or "locking in" the standard.
B. How Are Standards Made?
The history and present circumstances of the U.S. standards sector
are fascinating and bound up with basic themes in American history.
But for present purposes, only a few things are really important to
know. First, at the risk of redundancy, the standards sector is large.
Though an exact measurement would be very labor intensive to come
by, a reasonable prediction is that the amount of "private" law in the
United States, made in more or less legislative fashion by private
bureaucracies, now exceeds the amount that is "public." Moreover,
the consequences of this fact are aggravated by diminished public
resources and the government "downsizing" mania of the past few
decades. The relative importance of the standards sector as a
regulator of our economy is exaggerated by the fact that government
downsizing has devastated the government's own ability to administer
those laws that it does oversee.
26 See infra Part 1Il.
27 See Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time for
Reflection and Choice, 33 PuB. CoNT. L.J. 321, 330-37 (2004); Steven L. Schooner,
Competitive Sourcing Policy: More Sail Than Rudder?, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 263, 278-84
(2004).
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Second, the standards sector as we now know it has evolved over a
long period of time, and a central theme of that evolution is the close
relations between SSOs and government at all levels. As for state and
local governments, parties on all sides have carefully nurtured
relations for mutual benefit.28 The benefit to SSOs includes, perhaps
in addition to other things, influence-thousands of private standards
are now routinely adopted directly into state and local law. The
advantage to state and local governments includes at least the saving
in legislative resources. It may also include the opportunity to favor
influential lobbies, as for example when state bar authorities adopt
ethical rules and law school accreditation decisions of the American
Bar Association. An important aspect of relationships like these-
which is relevant in Part III below-is that, when state and local
governments adopt standards, they often do so through either
incorporation by reference or verbatim adoption. While this is
obviously not true of all standards-such as the adoption of lawyer
ethics rules, for example-the evidence is that, when private
standards are adopted, they are given very little substantive
consideration by formal government representatives. When that
happens, substantive policy is formulated within the SSOs and not by
government.
The federal government's relationship with SSOs has been more
complex. Like state and local governments, the federal government is
a large consumer of private standards, but the federal government has
also participated in the very creation of the standards sector. Still, the
federal government's role mainly has been reactive, supportive, and,
ultimately, passive. Its role has been to nurture or comply in the
creation of a regulatory system that, for reasons of politics-not,
fundamentally, reasons of practical or logical necessity-has
remained "private" and that effectively handles a very large portion of
this country's regulatory work. Over the long history of the growth of
this apparatus, the federal government's relationship to SSOs has
been highly deferential, and, above all, the relationship has been ad
hoc. That is hardly to say, however, that this relationship has been
unimportant.
The bulk of U.S. policy toward private regulation resides in the
symbiosis between two entities, one public and one nominally private.
They are the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
a federal agency within the Department of Commerce, and ANSI, a
28 See Case Study, supra note 1.
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privately organized body that, as the political scientist Samuel Krislov
29
put it, acts as a "holding company" to oversee other private entities.
NIST and ANSI have partnered in varying ways to oversee U.S
standards activity for roughly one hundred years. A chief theme of
this relationship has been NIST's almost unwavering deference to the
private sector and ANSI's generally leading role. Thus, while ANSI
often claims not to produce any standards of its own,3 0 it sits atop a
more or less formal hierarchy that produces the vast bulk of
America's private regulation. ANSI does so chiefly through its
stewardship over the American National Standards (ANS), a large
collection of standards made by ANSI's SSO members according to
ANSI's prescribed procedural framework.3 1  While it is not entirely
accurate to imagine U.S. standard setting as a neat pyramid with
ANSI at the top,32 the bulk of the work is undertaken within the ANSI
family of organizations and is subject to ANSI procedural oversight.
29 See KRISLOV, supra note 9, at 101. Organized as a non-profit corporation composed
of about one hundred thousand company, organization, and government members, ANSI
was created in 1918 as an umbrella organization to coordinate the efforts of the several
independent SSOs that had sprung up during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. About ANSI Overview, ANSI, http://www.ansi.org/about-ansi/overview
/overview.aspx?menuid-1 (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
30 Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R.
.1086 Before the Task Force on Antitrust of the H. Comm on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 11
(2003) (statement of David L. Karmol, Vice President of Public Policy and Government
Affairs, American National Standards Institute) ("ANSI does not write standards; it serves
as a catalyst for standards development by its diverse membership.").
The claim seems false in two senses. First, through its effective control of the loose
system of U.S. standard setting, ANSI has standardized the process by which the vast bulk
of standards are adopted (mainly by setting standards for what ANSI describes as "due
process"). Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1343-47. Second, about twenty-five percent of the
standards included in ANSI's American National Standards are developed by the
American National Standards Committees. Id. at 1343. These committees are created
under ANSI auspices and are normally managed by one of ANSI's own organizational
members, which ANSI appoints as the committee's "secretariat." Id. Thus, though
functionally separate, it is somewhat hard to see any distinction in substance between
ANSI itself and the development of these standards.
31 The actual process by which ANSI's subsidiary SSOs do their work and seek
approval of their standards as American National Standards is quite complex. A very nice
summary can be found in Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1341-68.
32 ANSI's own members are not required to submit their standards for inclusion in the
American National Standards, and with some frequency they do not. Likewise, there are
any number of U.S. SSOs that are not ANSI members at all and do not submit their
standards to it. Some such outside organizations are quite influential and often they
promulgate standards that overlap and conflict with American National Standards. See
Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1342-43. Likewise, industry consortia, now a significant
feature of private regulation, are outside the ANSI framework.
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Beyond the NIST-ANSI partnership, the world of private
regulation in the United States is fairly divorced from traditional
government. This world remains dominated by a handful of very
large SSOs, most of which are within the family overseen by ANSI.3 3
Most of these entities arose during the late nineteenth or early
twentieth centuries, at a time when ANSI itself had not yet been
formed to coordinate their activities, and they seem mainly to have
reflected the then booming American Industrial Revolution. They
served societal concerns about growing risks to labor and consumers
and the growing need to coordinate manufacturing for interoperability
among products.34 Other major organizations arose during the same
period and have played lasting roles but have served interests other
than the needs of industry or professional groups. For example, the
well-known Underwriters Laboratories, initially created by a group of
insurers to reduce liability for fire damage, evolved into a fully
independent testing laboratory primarily concerned with promoting
the safety of consumer products. Likewise, Consumers Union,
publisher of the familiar Consumer Reports magazine, began as an
offshoot of a NIST predecessor and was led by officials of the
predecessor agency who were frustrated by its refusal to champion
consumer protection objectives.s
The federal government's fondness for the private standards sector,
and its eagerness neither to regulate nor usurp it, has now grown so
great that it has made itself their largest consumer. Through statute
and elaborate implementation rules, the government has required
itself to use privately adopted standards in both federal procurement
33 By far the most significant of these is the American Society of Testing and Materials,
which is both the largest producer of standards in the United States and the source of about
half of ANSI's American National Standards. See id at.1342. Other such entities are the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, and the American Gas Association.
34 Id at 1368. Often cited examples of the need for standardization perceived at the
turn of the century include a major fire in the City of Baltimore, at which firefighters from
other cities had to stand by helplessly because their hose couplings would not fit the city's
water supply; a boiler explosion at a shoe factory in Brockton, Massachusetts, that killed
fifty-eight people and wounded 117 others; and the need for efficiency and conservation in
the government's manufacturing effort during World War I. See KRISLOV, supra note 9,
at 27, 90-91; Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1368.
35 See KRISLOV, supra note 9, at 94-95. Strictly speaking, Consumers Union does not
promulgate "standards" or any sort of regulatory guidance but rather tests products and
reports on their safety and quality. However, the organization grew out of the standards
movement ofthe turn of the twentieth century and serves its basic agenda.
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and reulation wherever they exist and meet certain minimum
criteria.
C. Antitrust Treatment
Again, courts have not been insensitive to the antitrust risks that
SSOs might pose, and notwithstanding the fact that SSOs recently
earned a large measure of statutory protection,3 7 most of their conduct
is nominally subject to some antitrust scrutiny. In an earlier day, the
courts took quite a firm stance, most prominently in the famous
Radiant Burners opinion of 1961-a very terse per curiam reversal of
a dismissal in which the Court, relying almost exclusively on its then
recent Klors decision, seemed to hold any arbitrary refusal to certify a
38given product to be per se illegal. However, despite some more
39
recent indications that the Court still meant business, the more
36 See National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-113,
110 Stat. 775 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 272 (2006)) (mandating the use by federal
agencies of any "voluntary consensus" standard that exists in their procurement and
regulation). The "voluntary consensus" provision is implemented by the Office of
Management and Budget, Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary
Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, Circular No. A-i 19, Rev.,
63 Fed. Reg. 8546.(Feb. 19, 1998).
37 Standards Development Organization Advancement (SDO) Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (2004) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (2006)).
The SDO Act modified the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993 to
provide that traditional voluntary consensus SSOs could enjoy the same protections as
joint ventures enjoy under that Act. 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (2006). That is to say that (1) so
long as the SSO engages only in "developing, promulgating, revising, amending,
reissuing, interpreting, or otherwise maintaining a voluntary consensus standard, or using
such standard in conformity assessment," id. § 4301(a)(7), it can be challenged only under
the rule of reason, id § 4302; (2) the SSO may enjoy an award of attorney's fees if it
"substantially prevail[s]" in an antitrust suit on that conduct, id. § 4304; and (3) if the SSO
makes a proper filing with the enforcement agencies, it can be liable only in actual
damages for that conduct, id. § 4303.
38 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1961)
(citing Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959)).
39 First, during the eighties the U.S. Supreme Court decided two important cases
upholding antitrust liability for SSOs or their members. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp.
v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988) (upholding liability for an SSO member that
abused the SSO's procedures to procure a standard unfavorable to a competitor's product);
Am. Soc'y Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (upholding
liability for an SSO where one of its agents, who was the plaintiffs competitor,
manipulated the organization's procedures to deny the plaintiffs product a certification).
Second, as Gates's article nicely explains, the Northwest Wholesale Stationers Court
gave one laconic, apparently approving indication that some SSO behavior could still be
per se illegal. See Gates, supra note 2, at 625-27. The Court's famous discussion of
forms of boycott that are still per se-those that "involve[] joint efforts by a firm or firms
to disadvantage competitors by ... directly [depriving them ofj relationships the[y] .
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recent trend has been much more deferential.4 0  In the course of
making these rulings, the courts frequently make a point of stressing
41the social benefits that standardization may bring.
But beyond that, all that can really be said is that the courts'
current approach to SSO cases is a makeshift one that leaves much
uncertainty. The courts have said little more than that, absent nakedly
anticompetitive side agreements among members or some other
blatant abuse, standard-setting conduct is subject to some
unelaborated degree of rule of reason scrutiny.4 2 Among the major
issues is whether the procedural propriety of an SSO's decision
making can matter. "No" might seem a reasonable guess, given the
uncompromising explanation Justice Brennan gave in the analytically
similar Northwest Wholesale Stationers case:
[T]he absence of procedural safeguards [within a private
organization] can in no sense determine .. . antitrust analysis. If the
challenged 'concerted activity of [the organization's] members
would amount to a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, no
amount of procedural protection would save it. If the challenged
action would not amount to a violation of § 1, no lack of procedural
protections would convert it into a per se violation because the
need in the competitive struggle"-included a citation to Radiant Burners. Nw.
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294 (1985)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The citation included in a parenthetical that the case
involved "denial of necessary certification of [a] product." Id; see Gates, supra note 2, at
625-27 (discussing Radiant Burners). Later courts have distinguished this citation by
pointing out that, in Radiant Burners, the only supplier of natural gas in Chicago agreed
with a manufacturer's association to supply gas only to homes that used the association
members' products. In other words, refusal of the certification actually meant total
exclusion from the market. See, e.g., Consol. Metal Prods. Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst.,
846 F.2d 284, 291 n.21 (5th Cir. 1988).
40 See, e.g., Schachar v. Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397, 399 (7th Cir.
1989) (physician's association could not violate antitrust, as a matter of law, by publicly
asserting that a new medical procedure was "experimental"); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron
Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 489-91 (1st Cir. 1988) (SSO did not violate antitrust by
refusing to certify manufacturer's product as compliant with SSO's product standard);
Consol. Metal Prods., 846 F.2d 284 (denial of certification of a product as compliant with
defendant SSO's standard, even where SSO includes horizontal competitors whose
products would compete with plaintiffs new, cheaper technology, and the evidence
suggested that denial was "unjustified," could not violate antitrust); Eliason Corp. v. Nat'l
Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1980) (SSO's testing and certification program
could not violate antitrust even though it tended to exclude non-approved products from
the market).
41 See, e.g., Consol. Metal Prods., 846 F.2d at 296; Eliason, 614 F.2d at 129.
42 See generally Gates, supra note 2, at 643-47 (summarizing the case law and making
a similar criticism).
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antitrust laws do not themselves impose on joint ventures a
requirement of process.
That one passage, after all, put to rest some decades of lower court
case law on SSOs that had said quite the opposite.44 But at least in
the SSO context, Justice Brennan's broad language cannot mean what
it says. Rule of reason treatment of SSO conduct almost inevitably
invites consideration of the process by which the challenged decision
45
was reached. Radiant Burners, which is still nominally good law,
appears to have based its theory of liability on the SSO's failure to
apply "objective standards" to* its. certification decisions, instead
making them "arbitrarily and capriciously." It also mattered that the
exclusion of plaintiffs products was effected regardless of "what[]
may [have] be[en] their virtues."4 6 Allied Tube and Hydrolevel even
more plainly found anticompetitive effects on abuses or evasions of
procedural norms.
Likewise, it is unclear to what if any extent rule of reason analysis
is permitted as to the substance of an SSO's decision. A few courts
seem to have implied that the technical grounds for the SSO's
decision cannot be considered in antitrust litigation,4 7 but that has
been unpopular with commentators and appears not to be uniformly
48ishrthe law. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that it really could be the law.
If in a given case a standard was clearly baseless or manifestly
contrary to the scientific evidence, it seems likely that courts would
consider that fact relevant to anticompetitive purpose and effects.
- II
THE UBIQUITY OF PRIVATE COORDINATION AND ISOMORPHIC
MARKETS
No one can presently say how many SSOs there are or how many
standards they issue. One estimate puts the number of private
43 Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 293 (1985).
44 See Gates, supra note 2, at 616-17.
45 See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l F.potball League, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2210 (2010) (citing
Radiant Burners as authority for treatment of legally single entities as subject to section 1
of the Sherman Antitrust Act in some cases).
46 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 658-59
(1961).
47 See, e.g., Consol. Metal Prods., 846 F.2d at 292.
48 See Anton & Yao, supra note 2, at 248; Gates, supra note 2, at 644-47.
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standards in operation at something over one million,4 9 but that
estimate is probably conservative. Regardless of whether a full
estimate is even really theoretically feasible, it likely will never be
undertaken.50 At least for the time being, it is thought that the
majority of U.S. standards are made by only about twenty of the
largest, traditional voluntary consensus SSOs,5 1 but the remaining
minority is undertaken by a very large number of other entities. The
range of products and services they regulate is mind-boggling, even
52
within the more traditional technology and manufacturing sectors.
The very substance of matters such as education, international
business transactions, medical procedures, accounting rules,
regulation of the professions, and human safety are simply no longer
49 This is the current estimate at one of the most comprehensive repositories of
standards-related information, CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG, http://www.consortiuminfo.org
(last visited Mar. 9, 2011). That site is maintained in part by a private law firm, Gesmer
Updegrove, LLC, and was initially created with financial support from Sun Microsystems.
Id.
. 50 There are two things wrong with all current attempts to keep track of active SSOs.
First, those lists that exist tend to include only technical product or process organizations.
They exclude the large range of other private regulatory bodies that ought to be included,
at least for my purposes here. For example, they usually exclude the American Bar
Association, even though its function as the accreditor of U.S. law schools could not be
any more like "standard setting." See Case Study, supra note 1, at 1411-12. Second,
following the rise of the contemporary high-tech economy, and the advantages in high-
tech industries for private standardization, the creation, life, and death of new SSOs has
accelerated to a tremendous pace. See Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 2, at 1896-
98 (explaining the nature and current circumstances of SSOs in high-tech industries).
51 As of about 2006, ANSI estimated that the twenty largest SSOs produce about ninety
percent of U.S. standards, but it has not since revised that estimate. See Introduction to
ANSI, ANSI, http://www.ansi.org/about-ansi/introduction/introduction.aspx?menuid=1
(last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
52 These include, for example, the Air Conditioning Contractors of America, the
Building Performance Institute, the Cemented Carbide Producers Association, the Door
and Access Systems Manufacturers Association, the Electrical Apparatus Service
Association, the Fluid Controls Institute, the Glazing Industry Secretariat Committee, the
Hardwood Plywood & Veneer Association, the International Association of Plumbing &
Mechanical Officials, the Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation, the
Kitchen Cabinet Manufacturers Association, the Laser Institute of America, Mobility Golf,
the National Air Duct Cleaners Association, the Outdoor Power Equipment Institute, the
Portable Sanitation Association International, the Rubber Manufacturers Association, the
Society for Protective Coatings, the Truss Plate Institute, the Unified Abrasives
Manufacturers Association, the Vinyl Institute, and the Window and Door Manufacturers
Association. ANSI, ACCREDITED STANDARDS. DEVELOPERS (2011), available at
http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards Activities/American National
Standards/ANSI Accredited Standards Developers/FEB llASD-basicinfo- 1.pdf
Appropriately enough, there is an SSO known as the Porcelain Enamel Institute. See
PORCELAIN ENAMEL INST., littp://www.porcelainenamel.com (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
Presumably, it represents the interests of manufacturers of the kitchen sink.
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in the hands of the "government" as we have traditionally known it.5 3
Groups with characteristics that are essentially similar to the SSOs
with which we are familiar-that is, essentially similar traits,
memberships, and procedures-are engaged in similar conduct
throughout the U.S. economy.
To claim that these groups seem "essentially similar" is not
superficial or aesthetic. It has an important theoretical purpose. All
such groups.(1) "regulate," in the sense that their standardizing acts
have some source of influence, and therefore constrain the choices
that individuals and firms might otherwise make on a price basis, and
(2) the substance of those "regulatory" actions cannot be assumed
simply to reflect or incorporate the influences of price competition.
The second of those claims is the more important one, and it is the
claim that I offer as my first critique of the bureaucracy-markets
dichotomy. One might try to argue that price theory remains
essentially unaffected by the profusion of standard setting, if we could
assume that so many SSOs have come into being only to do more
efficiently xhat markets might otherwise do. That would imply a
theory of market ordering that resembles the "make-or-buy" decision
modeled in the work of Oliver Williamson and other neo-
institutionalist or "transaction cost" economists.54 That is, we might
argue that SSO members collaborate only to save on some costs that
would occur if they tried to achieve similar results independently.55
53 In some sense this may be a misleading way to phrase the problem. It is often not the
case that private groups have taken over regulatory work that previously was done by
government. Many of the problems now handled by private SSOs, even to the extent that
they existed or were perceived as matters of social concern before the SSOs tried to solve
them, were never governmentally regulated except through the common law of tort,
property, and contract. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective,
38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986) (describing a continuum of regulatory approaches from tort
law at one end to fully invasive regulation at the other and noting that, prior to the
twentieth century, most "regulation" tended far toward the tort law end of the spectrum).
5 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1983); R.H. Coase, The Nature
ofthe Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 398-401 (1937).
55 There have been efforts to model private regulatory conduct-which can be thought
of as a "privatization" of a government regulatory function-as merely a make-or-buy
decision. See JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUI)LIC ENDS, PRIVATE
MEANS (1989); Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J.
389 (2003); Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost
Economics Perspective, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306 (1999); see also Terry M. Moe, The
New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 758-66 (1984) (charting the
then nascent rise of transaction-cost applications to politics and public bureaucracy, while
being cautiously optimistic about the movement's promise, despite concerns that important
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If so, even markets pervasively overseen by SSOs could still lead to
equilibria very similar to those that markets themselves would
produce in the absence of transaction costs. That would seriously
undercut my criticism of the bureaucracy-markets dichotomy; it could
be the case that sectors not directly overseen by governments are
effectively still market-regulated: We might hypothesize that
standards would tend to minimize production cost-just the way
markets do. Or they might optimize dynamic efficiency or lead to
ethical conduct among professionals that is optimal given the costs to
clients. But we would need to multiply the minimum number of
assumptions rather dramatically to reach this result to argue that
private standards simply produce the same, allocationally efficient
equilibria that cost-free markets would otherwise produce. The
argument would imply that the individual SSO participants take each
of their specific actions as opportunities to maximize their own or
their employers' gains from sales of goods or services. This seems
exceedingly unlikely, especially in formal consensus SSOs, where
participants include many members from government and academia.
Moreover, even in the seemingly more profit-motivated industry
consortia, engineering staff ordinarily represents member firms.
Those employees pose not only the agency cost problems that occur
in all organizations but also the special problem that engineers are
influenced by a professional culture, and as a group, they have been
shown to be frequently hostile to the profit-maximizing interests of
56individual firms. These points are borne out by the theoretical and
empirical evidence suggesting that SSO technical committees
ordinarily do not reach decisions that would maximize the member-
firms' self-interest.
Thus, I believe that SSOs are an important example of the
mediating buffer that some social scientists perceive between price
pressures and individual or firm decision making. Among the leading
exponents are sociologists Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, who
argue that "the engine of organizational rationalization has shifted"
differences exist between political organizations and the profit-motivated firms that were
the traditional subject of transaction-cost models).
56 See sources cited supra note 10.
57 See Weiss, supra note 10, at 37-41 (modeling technical committee voting behavior,
using both public choice theory and game theory, to suggest that voting equilibria will be
unstable and subject to strategic behavior); Martin B.H. Weiss & Marvin A. Sirbu,
Technological Choice in Voluntary Standards Committees: An Empirical Analysis, 1
ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 111 (1990).
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from the desire for efficient markets to "individual efforts to deal
rationally with uncertainty and constraint," efforts that take place
within organizations of "key suppliers, resource and product
consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce
similar services or products."58  Moreover, they argue that these
social institutions-these "efforts to deal rationally" with
circumstances-seem to grow more similar over time, which reflects
something important about society, Admitting that some of this
"isomorphism" among organizations could be explained by
competitive forces, as of course would be the traditional
explanation,59 DiMaggio and Powell argue that much institutional
isomorphism has become shielded from the rationalizing influence of
market competition. A larger implication of their work is that as
institutions themselves come to have greater independent
rationalizing force -as they grow in their bilateral power asymmetry
vis-A-vis natural persons and other organizations-they increasingly
displace the regulatory importance either of traditional government
institutions or market pressures.
III
THE ANTITRUST MODEL OF "GOVERNMENT" AND THE CAUSATION
ISSUE
In Part II, I argue that the work of SSOs, even when they are not
overseen by government, cannot be assumed to be simply some
market-driven phenomenon explainable by price theory. In this Part,
I argue that SSOs also illuminate a different problem, which I have
said is a flip-side problem. They cast doubt on the idea that activity
removed from market constraints is thereby, ipso facto, overseen by
the publicly accountable institutions of our traditional democratic
theory. This will be seen in the federal case law in which courts have
been asked for a remedy against SSOs for plaintiffs harmed when a
formal government body adopts an SSO's standard. Most of these
cases have considered only the availability of antitrust relief, but there
clearly is no remedy of any kind against an SSO in such a case. And,
of course, SSOs are not subject to the democratic constraints of
58 See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. Soc. REv. 147,
147-48 (1983); see also Olshan, supra note 9.
59 See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN Busmss (1977).
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formal government because none of their members are elected. In
other words, SSOs are to some extent exempt from market oversight
(as I argue in Part II), but they are also removed from those very
judicial and democratic constraints that define our ordinary notion of
government.
Whether they like to admit it or not, when courts apply antitrust,
they necessarily imply a model of government in some cases.
Inevitably, given certain deep commitments in our political
philosophy, some antitrust cases will seem to pose the risk that a
private person or firm will be held personally liable even though the
real "cause" of the harm was something that the government did. The
Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether a private person
could be liable for harm caused by government, despite some
arguments to the contrary.60 The issue has arisen quite prominently
in a line of lower court decisions involving SSOs that are privately
organized but have become influential with state and local
governments. Again, when government adopts private standards, the
act of adoption frequently involves little or no substantive
deliberation about the standards themselves. These adoptions are
rubber stamps. State and local governments have even occasionally
incorporated by reference future amendments to a private standard.
Moreover, relations between powerful SSOs and their state
government clients have often developed over long periods, with
mutual, benefits, and often with the SSOs' careful nurturing.
Nevertheless, in a series of lower court decisions that now appear
firmly established, the courts have held that SSOs in such
circumstances enjoy Noerr-Pennington immunity for any harm that
flows from the government-adopted standards. 6 1 The idea is that the
60 See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
61 See Mass. Sch. of.Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1037 (3d
Cir. 1997) (holding the ABA immune from antitrust action for law school accreditation
activities); Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., Inc., 17 F.3d 295, 301 (9th Cir. 1994)
(immunizing deliberate misrepresentations to an SSO because alleged harm was caused by
government regulation, not lobbying efforts); Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 956 F.2d 1378,
1383 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding the ABA immune for promulgation of model ethical rules);
Sherman Coll. of Straight Chiropractic v. Am. Chiropractic Ass'n, 654 F. Supp. 716, 728
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (holding chiropractic trade association immune for school accreditation
activities), af'd without opinion 813 F.2d 349 (11th Cir. 1987); Zavaletta v. Am. Bar
Ass'n, 721 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Va. 1989) (holding the ABA immune for accreditation
activities); cf Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 250 (7th
Cir. 1994) (holding that, while a psychiatric certification board's decisions were the basis
of granting certain state benefits, the board was not a "state actor").
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SSO is simply a private entity petitioning its government, asking that
a particular model code it has drafted be made law.
The Seventh Circuit, in a somewhat notorious opinion, also
suggested that standardization really is only the expression of opinion,
even when there is no government involvement whatsoever. The
court held that, because an SSO's certification ruling is no more than
the "provi[sion] [of] information," it cannot violate antitrust so lon
as it "does not constrain others to follow its recommendations."6
That characterization would seem incorrect in light of the previously
decided Allied Tube,63 but more important for the present topic was
the opinion's metaphysical characterization of what standardization
is. Writing for the majority, Judge Easterbrook came perilously close
to calling it constitutionally protected speech. He wrote that an SSO's
The issue would have come up again in the FTC's Unocal action had that matter not
been resolved by consent decree, and it would have been raised there in a novel posture.
Rather than a nominally private SSO defendant asserting immunity, Unocal would have
been a private defendant asserting immunity for engaging in a patent hold-up before a
quasi-public SSO. Unocal successfully raised that Noerr-Pennington theory before an
administrative law judge, but the Commission reversed, finding both that there was a
"fraud" exception to the immunity and that some of Unocal's illegal conduct had occurred
before nongovernment entities. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 138 F.T.C. 1, 72 (2004). The issue
was mooted, however, when Unocal merged with Chevron, and Chevron entered a consent
decree with the Commission. Under the decree Chevron agreed not to assert any of
Unocal's rights under patents included in the CARB standard. Chevron Corp., 140 F.T.C.
100 (2005).
62 Schachar v. Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397, 399 (7th Cir. 1989).
63 Schachar attempted to distinguish Allied Tube as having involved more than a mere
adoption of a standard-that it involved some "enforcement device[]." Id. But that
distinction seems utterly incorrect. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.,
486 U.S. 492, 498 n.2 (1988) (noting that the only theory of harm on which the verdict for
plaintiff had been based-a verdict that the Court upheld-was "the stigma of not
obtaining [an SSO's] approval of [plaintiffs] products and [the defendant SSO member's]
'marketing' of that stigma," which "caused independent marketplace harm to [plaintiff] in
those jurisdictions permitting use of' plaintiffs product); see also id. at 500 ("In this case,
the restraint of trade on which liability was predicated was the [SSO's] exclusion of
[plaintiffs] product" from its standard.); Mark R. Patterson, Antitrust Liability for
Collective Speech: Medical Society Practice Standards, 27 IND. L. REV. 51, 63-78 (1993)
(criticizing Schachar and its disregard for the anticompetitive potential of some
information).
Consolidated Metal Products is a similar decision, and it contains dicta that might seem
to support the reasoning in Schachar, but the resemblance is superficial only. Consol.
Metal Prods., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1988). In that case,
plaintiffs product was certified as compliant with the SSO's standard. Id. at 288.
Plaintiff's entire theory of harm was that the SSO's certification process took longer than
plaintiff thought appropriate (two years-perfectly ordinary in the context of voluntary
consensus standard setting), and plaintiff failed to plead any facts relevant to either
conspiracy or anticompetitive effect. Id. at 293-97.
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"towering reputation does not reduce its freedom to speak out," and
that when it does so, "the remedy is not antitrust litigation but more
speech-the marketplace of ideas."6
In any case, that all might actually be fine if the courts gave some
consideration to whether, having removed SSOs from antitrust
review, they have preserved some other alternative for affected parties
to challenge the substantive policy adopted as law. For example, it
might not be so bad if, by holding an SSO exempt from antitrust when
it plays some role in making public policy, the courts meant to imply
that they will then hold the SSO subject to the rules of process,
representativeness, and transparency to which we hold our
government institutions. (E.g., they might make. available some
redress to plaintiffs under notions of due process or open government
from constitutional or administrative law.) Or the courts might reason
that, where the state rubber stamps an SSO standard, the state itself
could be subject to constitutional or administrative challenges for
process failures that occurred within the SSO's standard-setting work.
But of course the courts intend no such thing. Privately organized
SSOs not acting pursuant to any formal delegation of government
authority are subject to no obligations of constitutional or
administrative law, either directly or indirectly through review of the
state actors who adopt their standards.65 And there is little likelihood
of judicial challenge to government adoption of a previously
formulated private standard, no matter how flawed the SSO's process
may have been, particularly if the adoption is made by a state
legislature or Congress. Also, obviously enough, SSOs are not
subject to the other major constraint that democracies are thought to
place on their governments-the ballot box.
Moreover, a little-noticed problem is that, having inadvertently
created this class of odd, intermediary organizations, which live
between but are subject to neither public nor private law, the courts
have at least in some cases devised an ideal vehicle for the
distribution of state and local government pork-barrel largesse. It is
agreed by wide consensus that, in the pursuit of monopoly, there is no
better accomplice than government. These SSO immunity decisions
have created a way to seek government assistance-through the
adoption of privately arranged standards-that are triply impenetrable
to challenge. First, the work of SSOs will ordinarily be substantively
6 Schachar, 870 F.2d at 399-400.
65 See Case Study, supra note 1.
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inscrutable to the politicians who adopt them. Because state and local
officials typically will have little ability to second-guess the
substantive work that SSOs do, they will have no way to know
whether some unscrupulous party was able to manipulate an SSO.
Second, because SSOs are subject to no public law rules, interference
in their work by unscrupulous parties will not be subject to public
scrutiny through transparency or process obligations. And finally, so
long as a monopoly-granting standard is adopted as law, it cannot be
reviewed by courts for anticompetitiveness. In such a case, SSOs
66
appear to be truly impervious to all the legal tools that we have.
IV
Is THERE SOME ALTERNATIVE AS A MATTER OF POLICY?
While this Article is not meant to offer doctrinal solutions, it is
worth considering whether there are problems here that could be
better handled by our law. I think the short answer is, probably, no, at
least not with any short-term political feasibility. Elsewhere I have
written about the occasional doctrinal suggestions for better handling.
the problem of entities in between the public and the private. I
believe those other attempts, including my own, have been at best
68incomplete. While I am not yet sure I can now offer any better
solution, I believe the fundamental, root issue underlying the problem
is the murky concept of government as the "cause" of antitrust injury.
The courts in these cases are repelled by the idea of private liability
for government conduct. Though the reasons remain largely
unexpressed, it is no doubt from a commitment to our traditional
66 It has apparently been suggested on occasion that this all might be tolerable
nonetheless, given that much standard setting is done by voluntary consensus procedures.
See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, Law and Constitutionalism in the Mirror ofNon-Governmental
Standards: Comments on Harm Schepel, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM 189, 195-96 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004). I am not
comforted.
67 Pork in Texas, supra note 1, at 414-16.
68 My own effort was in Case Study, supra note 1. The problem with that approach was
that, while it would allow antitrust to check some abuses in overly close relationships
between governments and SSOs, it would pose a substantial risk to more traditional
lobbying. The other effort of which I am aware is the work of Einer Elhauge. See Einer
Elhauge, Making Sense ofAntitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1177 (1992);
Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope ofAntitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667 (1991). I
believe the problem in Elhauge's otherwise exhaustive and perceptive synthesis to be that,
though he seems to deny it, his approach would still require that, if injury is "caused" in
some ill-defined sense by "government," no private defendant could be liable for it. See
generally Pork in Texas, supra note 1.
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liberal individualism that courts find any alternative unthinkable. But
in fact, they are quite wrong.
At least in the abstract, if not in any politically plausible actual
outcome, this problem could be overcome. Scrutiny as to state or
local government "causation" is not relevant to any policy of the
antitrust laws, and protection from liability for harm "caused" by
government is not actually required by the First Amendment.
Moreover, I believe that Allied Tube-the opinion in which the
Supreme Court came closest to addressing the question of private
liability for harm caused by government action-did not actually hold
otherwise. The Court carefully reserved the question and did not
reach it.70 There is also this point: Allied Tube was written by Justice
Brennan, a jurist personally concerned with the place of voluntary
associations in our political order.7 1 Northwest Wholesale Stationers
(which he also wrote) plainly showed his concern that voluntary
associations not be too easily turned into "government" in the
traditional sense, refusing to let antitrust review evolve into an
administrative law that would render those associations subject to
duties of process and transparency. But a Justice who also believed in
the mission of the antitrust laws could not thereby have intended to
create this ambiguous third category of institutions in between the
public and private, subject neither to the government's process
constraints nor private law. All the reasoning in Allied Tube is flatly
against such a result.
Moreover, for what it may be worth, there remain at least two
government enforcement actions, the results of which have not been
overturned, in which a private entity was forced to *submit to
injunctive relief for harms "caused" by government. This was true in
the FTC's Unocal consent decree of 2005, mentioned above. 7 2 ' There,
69 See Case Study, supra note 1, at 1397.
70 See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 498 n.2 (1988)
(declining to consider an award for injuries against private parties stemming from the
adoption of a government ethics code).
71 Cf Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984). First Amendment
freedom of association recognizes
that certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture and
traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs;
they thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and
the power of the State. . . . [The freedom] safeguards the ability independently
to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty.
Id.
72 See supra note 4.
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a patentee of environmentally superior gasoline technology was found
by the FTC to have violated antitrust when it misled a California
regulatory authority into incorporating its patented technology into a
state-mandated standard. Likewise, in the consent order reached in
American Society of Sanitary Engineering in 1985,73 the FTC frankly
acknowledged that its theory of harm was based on adoption by state
and local governments of the defendant SSO's standards. Indeed the
FTC apparently asserted no other basis for liability. The FTC, at
least, believes that government as "cause" of the asserted harm is not
a bar to liability.
V
CONCLUSIONS AND THIS SYMPosIUM's THEME
The question posed by the American Antitrust Institute's
symposium was whether the boundaries between what is public and
what is private might be in transition. I am not sure just how broadly
I can answer that question on the basis of the SSO evidence alone.
After all, there is a whole world of discussion now of "privatizing" or
"contracting out" arrangements, and much of our economy is
governed or affected by our dozens of quasi-public federal
corporations and "government sponsored entities." But in one sense
at least I believe I can say that the character of our resource allocation
has not actually changed that much in some time. So in a crude sense,
my answer is no, the boundaries are not in transition. Throughout
much of the twentieth century, important policy choices have been
made by entities that make "standards," broadly defined. Those
entities are not formal government entities, and they are not very
similar to our traditional democratic institutions. But their work is
also not easily explained as the result of any market forces. So at the
very least, I think our imagery for understanding the "boundaries"
between government and the private sector leaves. a lot of detail
unaccounted for. But on the other hand, I do not believe that that
state of affairs has really changed very much for many decades.
73 Am. Soc'y of Sanitary Eng'rs, 106 F.T.C. 324 (1985).
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